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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to ease the planning of new toll projects by providing estimates of 
operating costs, and to help us make better informed decisions about the design of the toll collection 
system. To do so we use panel data for Norwegian toll companies to estimate average cost functions. 
The main results can be summarised as follows. We provide evidence of very important unexploited 
economies of scale. The estimates cost curves are very steep for traffic levels below the sample mean, 
and becomes almost entirely flat over a wide range above the sample mean. A higher share of vehicles 
using on board units will significantly reduce average costs. Competitive tendering will significantly 
reduce average operating costs by as much as 25 %. Our results also suggest that increased number of 
lanes, higher debt and passenger charging will increase average operating costs whereas average 
operating costs are lower for toll cordons compared with other projects. 
 
1. Introduction 
Toll financing in Norway has been used to finance new roads as a supplement to 
public funds for more than 70 years. While bridges often where subjected to tolls 
hundreds of years ago, toll financing as we know it today started in the early 1930s, 
when the Vrengen bridge situated near the town of Tønsberg were financed using 
tolls. Since 1980s the number and the type of projects financed by tolls have increased 
considerably. Today there are 48 toll projects scattered throughout the country. The 
seven toll cordons make up the bulk of the annual revenues while fjord crossings 
through tunnels and bridges still represent the majority of the projects.  
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The net revenues from toll financing constitute some 35 percent of the total annual 
budget for road construction. On average, Norwegian motorists spend 1400 NKr1 a 
year on tolls per vehicle. Naturally, this raises some controversy among the motorists, 
and the cost of toll financing remains an important issue both politically and 
economically. As the number of projects is increasing the need to establish better 
estimates of the costs and net revenues is crucial.  
  The objective of this paper is to ease the planning of new projects by providing more 
precise estimates of the operating costs, and to help us make better informed decisions 
about the design of the toll collection systems. Moreover, from an economic point of 
view it is essential to be able to choose the right projects for toll financing. Some 
projects are clearly better suited for this method of finance than others, where 
traditional finance through government funds is more appropriate.  
  In spite of the extensive experience in toll financing, little research has been done to 
examine solutions for minimising the operating costs and hence maximising the social 
surplus of each project. We have therefore carried out a study to establish a cost 
function that can identify the main cost drivers in toll projects.2 The empirical 
analysis is based on panel data for 26 Norwegian toll companies. A key issue will be 
to test whether or not toll collection is characterized by economics of scale, and to 
identify economic, technological and institutional variables that affect operating costs. 
  The literature on operating costs in the toll industry is scarce and close to non-
existing. The emphasis has traditionally been on the financial viability and -rewards 
of the projects rather than if toll financing in itself provides an attractive option from a 
social point of view (see for example Moles and Williams (1995) and Wentworth and 
Beresford (1998)). However, as congestion charging is more debated and attracts 
                                                 
1 1 NKr ≈ 0,13 € 
2 The present paper extends the analysis in Welde (2005). 
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more interest than ever, the need to curb the operating costs of such schemes becomes 
ever more crucial. Controversial issues such as congestion charging rely heavily on 
public acceptance. This is demanding but, in our opinion, any road user charging 
scheme should at least pass a social cost-benefit analysis, it should generate 
substantial net revenues and it should be acceptable to a major proportion of the 
public. Minimising the operating costs is critical for meeting all these three basic 
criteria.  
  The importance of the operating costs in road user charging schemes has been the 
focus of a recent debate in Transport Policy (Prud’homme and Bocajero (2005), 
Mackie (2005) and Raux (2005)). Without proper focus on the cost of collecting tolls, 
an often celebrated scheme such as the London congestion charge might very well be 
an economic failure. This illustrates the need to examine operating costs further 
through a larger sample of toll projects. 
  This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the organisational and decision 
making framework of Norwegian tolling. Section 3 examines the costs of toll 
financing. Section 4 discusses properties of the panel data set used in this study and 
specifies the empirical model to be estimated. In Section 5 we present results from the 
empirical analysis. Section 6 shows how the empirical results can be used to predict 
operating costs while Section 7 offers some conclusions. 
 
2. Organisational framework of Norwegian tolling 
Norway provides a striking example of a country with extensive experience from toll 
financing. Over 100 projects have been financed using tolls and only one has ever 
gone bankrupt. Parts of this success rate can probably be explained by the stable 
organisational and legal framework surrounding the toll projects which has eased the 
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planning process for new projects and lead to a faster implementation of the projects 
than otherwise possible. 
  Each toll project is based on an initiative from the local municipality, local 
authorities or other members of the local community. This initiative is based on a real 
or perceived need for new roads in the area and will usually result in the founding of a 
toll company, organised as a limited liability company, non-recourse to the NPRA. 
The majority of the stocks are owned by public shareholders although private 
involvement is also common. The toll company acts as an enthusiast and will, often 
along with local politicians, work to establish political acceptance for the project. This 
process may take years and often includes lobbyism both locally and nationally until 
the project is approved by the Norwegian Parliament. Once the road project is 
realised, the role of the toll company is to operate the toll system and to administer the 
toll revenues. The toll company is organised as a non profit enterprise and the share 
owners receive no dividends.  Each toll project is managed by a toll company, 
responsible for one project only. The toll collection is increasingly being contracted 
out from the toll companies to commercial toll road operators. 
  The local initiative is regarded as crucial to both political and public acceptance for 
the toll projects and local authorities typically act as guarantors through a system of 
conditional reimbursement for the loans taken up. Very few projects are exclusively 
financed by tolls and there is usually a mix between public and private funds for most 
projects. The local willingness to pay tolls will hence often be followed by additional 
government funds that would otherwise not be available. 
  The toll company bases its activities on a standard legal arrangement with the NPRA 
and is subjected to extensive operating regulations. The collection of tolls is restricted 
to a period of up to 15 years and the tolls have traditionally been used for road 
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construction only. For the toll cordons the revenues have also been used for 
investment in public transport infrastructure (not operations and rolling stock) and 
today there is a development towards a more intermodal use of the toll revenues in 
urban areas. 
  In spite of the success rate of the toll projects, the organisational framework of 
Norwegian toll financing has come under growing criticism. The local initiative will 
often put the local roads administration under local political pressure and have often 
lead to the implementation of projects with a negative cost benefit ratio. Furthermore, 
it is increasingly being recognised that the relationship between the NPRA and the toll 
companies gives rise to a number of principal agent problems. The ever increasing 
number of toll companies implies that the asymmetry of information often observed in 
principal agent relationships becomes more visible and that the objectives of the 
NPRA and those of the toll companies often differ. Since the costs of monitoring the 
toll companies are high, the toll companies have sometimes pursued policies which do 
not reflect those of the NPRA. The toll companies have been criticised for not doing 
enough to minimise their costs and the NPRA has thus recently put more emphasis on 
operating costs and how these are influenced by the organisational framework as well 
as other variables. 
 
3. The costs of toll financing 
Toll financing is an important and integrated part of the total annual road investments. 
This implies that toll projects should be subjected to the same social cost benefit test, 
i.e. to be required to have a positive net social benefit, as other road projects. 
  As mentioned in section 2, the organisational framework of Norwegian toll financing 
may give rise to certain principal agent problems such as asymmetry of information 
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and insufficient incentives for cost efficiency. We do, for example, observe that the 
marginal operating cost of the toll companies vary considerably with variations 
between 5-10 % and 35-40 %. This might be due to differences in tolls and traffic 
levels but it nevertheless illustrates the need to choose the right projects for toll 
financing and the importance of better knowledge of costs and how the performance 
of the toll companies can be compared. Figure 1 illustrates the development in the 
marginal operating costs over the last decade. 
Figure 1 about here 
  A common critique against toll financing is that financing road investment through 
tolls is costly to society as the sum of the total finance and operating costs over the 
tolling period will be huge. However, if we assume that the average interest rate is 
equal to or close to the discount rate used in cost benefit analyses, the net present 
value of finance costs paid over the project period will be close to zero. The cost 
which remains is the additional risk premium private finance requires compared to 
public finance. For non-profit organizations such as the Norwegian toll companies 
this premium will presumably be low or close to non-existing but it is generally 
acknowledged that private finance is more expensive than public. The difference in 
finance costs between the public and private sector is likely to vary between countries 
and contractual structures. However, given the long tradition and the low risk of 
Norwegian toll financing it is likely that this difference is comparatively small. 
  On the other hand, no money is free, even to governments who normally raise their 
funds through some form of taxation. The estimates of the deadweight loss of taxation 
varies but if we assume a shadow price of public funds of 1.2, toll financing might 
actually be welfare improving compared to public finance if the total costs of toll 
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financing can be kept below 20 percent of the revenues. 3 This should therefore be the 
benchmark when we assess the performance of toll financing compared to public 
finance. 
  Introducing tolls on a road will generate a deadweight loss.4 By tolling the road, 
generalized costs will not be reduced according to the potential time savings by the 
new road and a deadweight loss will occur. The deadweight loss due to traffic 
deterrence will depend on the slope of the demand curve and the deviation from the 
marginal cost. Inelastic demand (a steep demand curve) will be largely unaffected by 
tolls whereas elastic demand will be more sensitive to tolls.  
  How motorists react to tolls are context specific but previous studies have mainly 
found demand elasticities to be relatively inelastic. Norwegian studies indicate 
elasticities between 0,3 and 0,8 (Odeck and Bråthen, 2004) while Hirschman et al 
(1995) found elasticities on bridges and tunnels into New York to average 0,1. Other 
studies from Singapore (Luk, 1999) and Spain (Matas and Raymond, 2003) reveal 
elasticities from 0,2 to 0,6 and 0,2 to 0,8. All studies show that the elasticities, and 
hence the dead weight loss, are larger in projects with high tolls and where an untolled 
alternative exists. Traffic levels and trip lengths can be extremely sensitive to tolls 
when motorists have an alternative to the tolled road and when tolls increase beyond a 
critical level. Under conditions as these, such as on Toronto’s Highway 407, Mekky 
(1999) have found toll elasticities as high as 4,0. 
  
On the other hand, under congested conditions traffic reduction and -rerouting is 
normally desirable. If tolls can reduce congestion and hence distort the motorists’ 
                                                 
3 In Norwegian cost- benefit analyses a standard shadow price of public funds of 1,2 is used. 
 
4 Shadow tolls have not been used to finance road investment in Norway. All tolls are real tolls. 
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behaviour in a desired direction, the operating costs will be the only costs of toll 
financing.  
  The marginal social costs of toll financing can hence be defined as follows5: 
 T
R
αμ α
+= −  (1) 
where μ is marginal social cost of toll financing, α operating costs, T  value of traffic 
deterrence and  R is gross toll revenues. 
  If μ in equation (1) can be kept below 0,2, the project should be financed using tolls 
rather than traditional public finance. This is a fact that is often ignored in the public 
debate.  
  The relevance of this is illustrated by a study currently being carried out by the 
NPRA (forthcoming). Quantifying the total marginal costs of toll financing (operating 
costs and traffic deterrence) in 4 toll projects showed that the marginal costs of toll 
financing were below 0,2 in three of the four projects examined. This shows that toll 
financing can be a good deal to society in some cases but also that the total marginal 
cost can exceed the shadow price of public funds in other cases, especially when the 
operating costs are high.  
  Focusing on operating costs is therefore important for both the decision maker and 
for the planner. The objective is evident – to save money! In order to do that, we will 
estimate a cost function that gives us better knowledge of toll financing and how this 
method of finance can be used to the benefit of society. 
 
4. Data and empirical specification 
In this study we utilise a panel data set for 26 toll companies. The panel data set is 
unbalanced; the longest time series is seven years (1998 – 2004) whereas the shortest 
                                                 
5 Larsen (1995) uses a similar expression. 
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series is 2 years. In addition to the 26 toll companies used in the empirical analysis, 
we have information for 4 companies in 2004, only. Information about these 
companies is used to investigate the out of sample predictions of the estimated model. 
  A key issue in the empirical analysis will be to test whether or not toll companies are 
characterized by economies of scale. To do so, we investigate the relation between 
average operating costs per paying vehicle, , and the total number of paying 
vehicles per year, . The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 reveal that 
both average operating costs and the traffic volume are very much dispersed. Average 
operating costs vary from 0.7 NKr to approximately 40 NKr per paying vehicle with a 
mean of approximately 6.6 NKr .Traffic varies from a minimum of 93 thousands to 
more than 90 millions paying vehicles per year with a mean of approximately 9 
millions. Figure 2 reports a cross plot of average operating costs against Traffic. It is 
rather evident from the raw data that average operating costs are decreasing in traffic 
volume. The average cost curve is very steep for low levels of traffic, but seems to 
become rather flat for traffic volumes somewhat above the sample mean. From Figure 
2 we also note that most observations cluster around a traffic volume below the 
sample mean whereas there are a few observations with a traffic volume close to the 
sample maximum. 
itAVC
itTraffic
Table 1 about here. 
Figure 2 about here 
  In order to investigate scale economics more formally, we formulate a modified 
Cobb-Douglas function given by 
 ( )21 2ln ln ln .AVC Traffic Traffic controlsα β β= + + +  (2) 
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This specification entails flexibility regarding scale economies. Our hypothesis is that 
average operating costs are decreasing in traffic ( )1 0β < , but might start to increase 
after a certain level. In the case of 1 0β <  and 2 0β > , the operating costs as a function 
of traffic will be U-shaped, and  the minimum of average costs is reached at a traffic 
volume given by 
 1 2/ 2MINTraffic e
β β−=  (3) 
  Equation (2) is expanded with a set of economic, technological and institutional 
variables that might affect average operating costs. We include the number of lanes in 
the toll station(s) because the number of lanes may increase the need for staff and 
equipment and therefore average costs. We also include financial debt as the toll 
companies report that a large share of the operating costs are related to financial 
management which might imply that average costs increases with higher debt.  
  As the number of cars equipped with on board units (OBUs) increase, the need for 
employees to man toll stations will decrease. As labour costs are the dominating cost 
components, we expect that projects with a high OBU share will have lower average 
costs that those with low (or zero) OBU share. 
  Toll cordons are in general larger than other projects and utilize modern technology. 
To investigate whether or not average costs are lower for toll cordons than for other 
projects, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the project is a toll cordon. 
Charging for passengers is only done in fixed link projects that have superseded ferry 
crossing where passengers traditionally have been charged. Since it is difficult to 
combine electronic fee collection and passenger charging, these projects might be 
more labour intensive, experiencing higher average operating costs. 
  Finally, we investigate whether or not competitive tendering reduces average 
operating costs. In a survey article, Domberger and Jensen (1997, p. 68) state that 
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“Substantial evidence that has emerged since the mid-1980s suggests that 
governments can save in order of 20 per cent of expenditures on services by putting 
them through a competitive tendering process”.  Based on this evidence, we include a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the project has been exposed for competitive tendering. 
  The upshot of the discussion above is the following specification of the average cost 
function 
 ( )21 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
ln ln ln lnit it it it it
it it it it t i it
AVC Traffic Traffic Lanes Debt
OBU TC PC COMP u
α β β β β
β β β β α η
= + + + +
+ + + + + + +  (4) 
where is the number of lanes in the toll station(s), is total debt by the 
end of each year,  is the  shares of vehicles using on board units, is a 
dummy variable for toll cordon, a dummy variable for passenger charging and 
a dummy variable for competitive tendering. Finally, 
itLanes itDebt
itOBU itTC
itPC
itCOMP tα is a full set of time 
dummies included to control for any effects of aggregate factors common to all 
companies, iη represents company specific random effects, and is the remaining 
error term assumed to be identically and independently distributed.
itu
6  
  Table 1 also reports also reveals that the other explanatory variables are highly 
dispersed: The number of lanes varies from 2 to 66 with a mean of 11.9, Debt varies 
from zero to 2.0 with a mean of 0.4, and the share of vehicles using on board unit, 
OBU, varies from 0 to 94 % with a mean of approximately 30%. From the 
decomposition of the standard errors, we also note that the dispersion is mainly due to 
variation between companies whereas the variation over time (within companies) is 
much less. For average operating costs the ratio of the between groups to the within 
                                                 
6 As one could argue that average costs decreases as toll companies gather experience and introduce 
more efficient organizational solutions, we also included variables measuring the number of years since 
the opening of the project. However, the estimated effects were both hard to interpret and statistically 
insignificant. 
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groups standard error is 6.5 whereas the corresponding ratio for Traffic is 17.5 and 
approximately 11 for Lanes.  
  Further inspection of the data shows that toll cordons are on average much larger 
than other projects, and they have significantly lower average operating costs – 
possibly resulting from economics of scale and the utilisation of the latest tolling 
technology. For toll cordons, the mean value of AVC is 1.3 NKr and mean value of 
Traffic is 32.9 millions paying vehicles. For other projects the corresponding numbers 
are 8.2 NKr and 1.66 millions paying vehicles. Projects with passenger charging are 
very small (mean of Traffic = 0.87 mill) and have higher average operating costs 
(mean value =11.1 NKr) than other projects. 
 
5. Empirical results 
The random effects model is estimated using Generalized Least Squares. Table 2 
reports empirical results for different specifications of the average cost function. 
Results for the most general specification given by equation (4) are reported in 
column I. We first note that the estimated parameters of the log of paying vehicles,  
 and its square, (  are both highly significant from zero. So are 
also the estimated effects of the share of vehicles using on board units, , and 
the dummy for competitive tendering, . The estimated effects of the log of 
lanes, , total debt,  and the dummy variables for toll cordon, , 
are all statistically significant at a level of significance below 10 per cent whereas the 
ln itTraffic )2ln itTraffic
itOBU
itCOMP
ln itLanes ,itDebt itTC
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dummy for passenger charging,  is more borderline significant (p-value = 
0.12).
,itPC
7
Table 2 about here 
As expected, average operating costs are decreasing in traffic volume. For low levels, 
increased traffic by 1 % will reduce average operating costs by approximately 2.3 %. 
The second order term is positive and statistically significant which means that the 
average cost curve becomes more flat for very high traffic volumes. The estimate of 
the second order term is small, and given the estimates reported in Table 2, column I, 
a hypothetical minimum of average costs is reached at a traffic volume of 
approximately 190 millions paying vehicles per year. Since this is well above the 
sample maximum of approximately 90 millions paying vehicles, this result indicates 
very important unexploited economies of scale. Figure 3 graphs average cost curves 
using the estimates in column I and mean values of all explanatory variables other 
than Traffic and COMP. The estimated cost curves are very steep for low traffic 
levels, but are almost entirely flat over a very wide range of traffic. 
Figure 3 about here 
For given traffic volume, increased number of lanes will increase average operating 
costs. The estimated elasticity in column I approximates 0.15. Although the estimated 
elasticity is rather small, the economic implications are important as the number of 
lanes is very dispersed across projects. The estimated elasticity implies that increasing 
the number of lanes from the sample minimum to maximum will increase average 
operating costs by 53 % whereas an increase by one standard deviation around the 
sample mean will increase average costs by 30 %. 
                                                 
7 These conclusions are based on tests with a two-sided alternative. With a one-sided alternative, all 
estimates except the effect of passenger charging have p-values below 0.05 whereas the p-value of PC 
is 0.061. 
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The estimated effect of total debt is 0.153 which implies that an increase from sample 
minimum to maximum will increase average costs by approximately 30 % while an 
increase by one standard deviation will increase average operating costs by 6.6 %.  
  A higher share of paying vehicles using on board units will reduce average costs 
significantly. The estimated effect is substantial as an increase in the OBU share from 
the sample minimum to the maximum value will reduce average costs by 34.6 % 
while an increase by one standard deviation (an increase by approximately 35 %) will 
reduce average costs by 13.4 %. 
  The dummy variable for toll cordons is negative and statistically significant. This 
means that a significant cost difference remains after controlling for scale (and other 
variables). Given the estimate in column I, toll cordons have approximately 20 % 
lower average operating costs than other toll projects.  
  The results in column I means that passenger charging has a cost driving effect of 
approximately 25 %, but the estimate of the dummy variable PC is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
  Finally, the dummy variable for competitive tendering is negative and statistically 
significant. The estimate based on the most general specification means that the 
benefits by competitive tendering is substantial as the average operating costs in such 
projects are approximately 24 % lower than in other projects. Figure 3 illustrates the 
difference in average operating cost for projects without (thin line) and with 
competitive tendering (thick line). Our result fits very well with the survey evidence 
reported in Domberger and Jensen (1997). 
  Turning to a sensitivity analysis we first exclude observations with extremely high 
traffic, cf. the outliers in Figure 2, and re-estimate the basic model. The results based 
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on the reduced sample reported in column II are all close to their corresponding 
counterparts based on the full sample. Hence, the results (especially concerning 
economics of scale) are not driven by a few, extremely high observations. 
  Since some of the estimated effects reported in column I are somewhat imprecisely 
determined, we carried out a simplification search by sequentially excluding variables 
with lowest t-statistics. The results based on the simplified models (using the full data 
set) reported in column III to V in Table 2 show that the partial estimates of the 
remaining variables are barely affected by excluding variables with statistically 
insignificant effects.  
  The time dummies included in the specifications reported in columns I to V  were 
jointly significant, but the results revealed a significant jump from 2001 to 2002, 
possibly due to the introduction of indirect taxes on services. In column IV we replace 
the full set of time dummies with a single step dummy, TA , which is equal to zero 
until 2001, and one thereafter. This simplification is accepted by data as a test of the 
simplification returned a p-value of 0.09. Again, the re-specification of the model has 
only minor impact of the estimated partial effects. 
X
  To summarise our findings, a comparison of the estimates for the different 
specifications reveals that the estimates of ln  and its square, the share of 
paying vehicles using on board unit, and the dummy variable for competitive 
tendering are always statistically significant and very robust with respect to 
specification. Also, the dummies for toll cordon and passenger charging are robust as 
long as they are included. While the former becomes statistically insignificant as the 
model is simplified, the latter is never significant from zero. The estimated effect of 
debt is also rather robust, but drops in magnitude and becomes statistically 
Traffic
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insignificant when the full set of time dummies are replaced with the single tax 
dummy. 
  The estimated cost driving effect of increasing the number of lanes seems to be 
rather sensitive with respect to model specification. The estimated effect drops and 
becomes statistically insignificant when the cost function is simplified. It might be 
somewhat surprising that the estimated effect of lanes becomes insignificant. 
However, the number of lanes is highly correlated with traffic (correlation = 0.75). 
Furthermore, one may argue that the number of lanes is an endogenous variable, and 
if the number of lanes is set optimally we should possibly expect a small effect of this 
variable. 
  Although most partial estimates are robust with respect to model specification, the 
estimated traffic level that minimises average operating costs is rather sensitive. The 
estimated costs curves are almost entirely flat over a wide rage of traffic which makes 
it hard to determine “optimal” traffic volume precisely. Nevertheless, all estimates 
except those reported in column IV implies an optimal traffic volume well above the 
sample maximum of 90 millions paying vehicles. 
 
6. Predictions 
As noted above, we have information about 4 companies for 2004 only. This 
information is used to investigate the out of sample predictive ability of the estimated 
model. Table 3 report actual values for average costs and predicted values using the 
estimates for Model I and Model VI. As is evident, the predicted values based on both 
models are close to the actual values for most companies. Using Model I, the average 
of absolute prediction errors is about 10.4 % of the actual values whereas the average 
prediction error is 11.2 % using model V. 
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Table 3 about here 
  This is encouraging. The model is largely based on historical data with observations 
going back to 1998. This does, however, not seem to affect its ability to predict the 
operating costs in new projects, often using different technological arrangements to 
those of previous years. If the estimation is repeated annually, as more observations 
are collected, it can thus be a powerful tool for planners who wish to predict the 
operating costs (and net revenues) in toll projects with a higher degree of accuracy 
than today.  
 
7. Concluding comments 
The objective of this paper has been to ease the planning of new toll projects by 
providing estimates of operating costs, and to help us make better informed decisions 
about the design of the toll collection system. To do so we have used panel data for 
Norwegian toll companies to estimate average cost functions. 
  The main results from the empirical analysis can be summarised as follows. First, we 
provide evidence of very important unexploited economies of scale. The estimates 
cost curves are very steep for traffic levels below the sample mean, and becomes 
almost entirely flat over a wide range somewhat above the sample mean. Second, a 
higher share of vehicles using on board units will significantly reduce average costs. 
Third, our results suggest that competitive tendering will reduce average operating 
costs by as much as 25 %. Our results also suggest that increased number of lanes, 
higher debt and passenger charging will increase average operating costs whereas 
average operating costs are lower for toll cordons compared with other projects. 
  Given the huge differences in the toll companies’ average costs, we suggest a rethink 
in the planning of toll projects. Instead of focusing on financial viability, more 
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emphasis should be put on maximising social surplus. This implies cost efficient 
solutions for collecting the tolls but perhaps more importantly, choosing the right 
projects for toll financing. Some projects are clearly unsuited for this method of 
finance and should instead be financed using other sources of finance.   
  Evidence from Norwegian toll projects clearly show that minimising the operating 
costs is important for achieving a positive benefit-cost ratio but also that toll financing 
in some cases can outperform traditional public finance. Quantifying the costs of 
traffic deterrence and the operating costs in selected projects reveals that the total 
(marginal) costs of toll finance can be kept below the shadow price of public funds. 
This means that successful toll financing in some cases can represent the difference 
between a negative and a positive cost benefit ratio. This is probably new knowledge 
to decision makers who often resort to toll financing due to financial constraints. 
Using the results presented in this paper, toll financing can thus not only finance 
much needed new road infrastructure but also improve the efficiency of the economy: 
A better deal for the motorists and for society. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Minimum 
 
Mean 
 
Maximum
 
Standard deviation 
     
Overall 
Within 
groups 
Between 
groups 
AVC 0.705668 6.599020 39.95037 7.378292 1.151346 7.49281 
Traffic 93338 9098203 90849406 19870054 1018446.64 17847561.21
Lanes 2 11.89781 66 17.67571 1.548356 16.70721 
Debt 0 0.381061 2.014335 0.433584 0.125425 0.4065797 
OBU 0 0.294347 0.94 0.364718 0.122277 0.360145 
 
Table 2 Estimated cost functions. Left hand side variable is  ln itAVC
 
Variable  I         II 
Ex 
outliers 
III  IV V VI 
 
ln itTraffic  
 
-2.298 
 (4.65) 
-2.356
 (3.60)
-2.439
 (4.96)
-2.472
 (4.72)
 
-2.376 
 (4.64) 
 
-2.292
(4.35)
( )2ln itTraffic  0.060  (3.55) 0.062 (2.74) 0.065 (3.86) 0.068 (3.85) 0.064  (3.71) 
 
0.062
(3.47)
Traffic at 
minimum AVC 
(millions) 
 
189.3 171.5 131.7 73.6
 
114.6 114.7
ln itLanes  0.152 
 (1.71) 
0.156
 (1.71)
0.104
 (1.23) 
- - -
itDebt   0.153 
 (1.85) 
0.208
 (1.82)
0.161
(1.94) 
0.135
(1.64)
0.151 
(1.83) 
0.097
(1.21)
itOBU  -0.368 
 (3.91) 
-0.369
 (3.83)
-0.376
 (3.98) 
-0.359
 (3.88)
-0.348 
 (3.53) 
-0.287
(3.18)
itTC  -0.203 
 (1.81) 
-0.195
 (1.69)
-0.195
 (1.73) 
-0.172
 (1.53)
-  -
itPC  0.243 
 (1.56) 
0.234
 (1.47) 
- - - -
itCOMP  -0.240 
 (2.92) 
-0.240
 (2.84)
-0.246
 (2.99)
-0.240
 (2.95)
-0.253 
 (3.08) 
-0.232
(2.83) 
itTAX  - - - -  - 0.202
(7.53) 
Const  21.450 
 (5.92) 
21.873
 (4.65)
22.565
 (6.30) 
22.607
 (5.89)
22.059 
 (5.86) 
21.408
(5.53)
 Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
σ  0.12709 0.13026 0.12751 0.12474 0.12616 0.12773
 
Notes: Estimated parameters with robust t-statistics in parentheses. Estimation method is GLS 
applied to RE-specification of the panel data model. The number of companies is 26 except 
for the regression in column II. The longest time series is 7 (1998 – 2004), shortest time series 
is 2. 
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Table 3. Actual values and out of sample predictions. Average operation costs. 
 
  Model I Model V 
Company Actual Predicted Error Predicted Error Traffic 
(1000)
28 4.570 5.862 1.291 5.820 1.250 559.7
29 0.920 0.843 -0.077 1.058 0.138 14 834.0
30 6.690 6.645 -0.045 6.581 -0.109 430.3
31 2.780 2.916 0.136 2.605 -0.175 1 858.8
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Marginal operating costs
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Figure 1: Marginal operating costs 
 24
0 1e7 2e7 3e7 4e7 5e7 6e7 7e7 8e7 9e7
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Traffic
AVC
 
Figure 2. Cross plot of average operating cost and traffic volume 
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Figure 3. Average cost curves based on estimates in column I, Table 3.  
 
